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Interim Relief and International Commercial Arbitration
in North Carolina: Where We Are and
Where We Should Be Looking
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration, as an alternative method of dispute resolution, has
become increasingly popular during the past twenty years.1 This is
especially true in the area of international commercial arbitration.2
Arbitration provides parties involved in international commercial
transactions with a method of resolving their disputes that takes into
account issues that are peculiar to international commerce.3
In light of this increasing popularity,4 North Carolina enacted its
International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ICACA or
the Act)5 in order to "promote and facilitate international trade and
commerce, and to provide a forum for the resolution of disputes that
may arise from participation therein."6 The ICACA largely follows the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),7
which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985.8
However although the Model Law was recently amended in 2006,9 the
1. See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role
In Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 208 (2002).See also William Wang,
Note, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1059, 1059 (2003).
2. See Wang, supra note 1, at 1059. See also Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim
Measures of Protection in International Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed
Solutions, and Anticipated Results, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 55, 55 (2003).
3. RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 2000).
4. Daniel A. Zeft, The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes and
the Absence of Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 705,
709 (1997).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-.87 (2007). This paper will address only the
general provisions and those specific to arbitration. See, e.g., §§ 1-567.30-.67.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.30 (2007).
7. George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International
Arbitrations, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419, 423 (1992).
8. UNCITRAL, EXPLANATORY NOTE BY THE UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT ON THE 1985
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AS AMENDED IN 2006 1 (2007),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/MLARB-
explanatoryNote20-9-07.pdf.
9. Id.
389
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ICACA's provisions addressing arbitration have remained unchanged
since its adoption in 1991.'°
The amended Model Law includes extensive revisions of Article
17 to include significantly greater guidance in the area of interim mea-
sures of relief.1 ' These revisions were considered necessary "in light of
the fact that such measures are increasingly relied upon in the practice
of international commercial arbitration." 12 Interim measures of relief
are essential to international commercial arbitration due to the fact
that they "have the effect of compelling parties to behave in a way that
is conducive to the success of the proceedings, preserving the rights of
the parties, preventing self-help, keeping peace among the parties, and
ensuring that an eventual final award can be implemented."1 3 The fear
is that without enforceable interim measures of protection, a favorable
final award may be meaningless as assets could be hidden, sold, or
removed from the jurisdiction. 14
While the ICACA does contain significant provisions addressing
interim measures, these provisions rely on the aid of courts in order to
provide parties with interim relief or enforce orders of the arbitral tri-
bunal granting such relief.' 5 When parties are required to turn to the
courts for such assistance, the benefits and attractiveness of arbitra-
tion are significantly diminished. 16 Moreover, the ability of an arbitral
tribunal to provide enforceable interim relief without court assistance
is especially significant in North Carolina in light of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's refusal to allow court-ordered pre-award attachment in aid of
arbitration. 17 State arbitration legislation that allows court-ordered
pre-award attachment could be preempted by federal arbitration law.' 8
By contrast, state arbitration provisions that authorize the arbitral tri-
bunal to order interim relief do not generally raise preemption con-
cerns. 19 Thus, in light of the relationship between federal and state
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-.67 (2007). While the Act was amended in
1997 to include the provisions for International Commercial Conciliation, and to
modify the general provisions in order to accommodate such additions, the provisions
addressing arbitration have remained unchanged.
11. UNCITRAL Explanatory Note, supra note 8, at 2.
12. Id.
13. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 55.
14. Id.
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39 (2007).
16. See Ferguson, supra note 2, at 57.
17. See generally I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981);
Alamria v. Telcor Int'l, 920 F. Supp. 658 (D. M.d. 1996).
18. See Zeft, supra note 4, at 765.
19. Id. at 764.
[Vol. 30:389390
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arbitration law, there is an even greater need for North Carolina to
reduce party reliance on the courts to provide interim relief during the
arbitral process.
However, it is also this relationship between federal and state arbi-
tration law that presents an opportunity for North Carolina to craft
such procedural rules. Procedural provisions, such as those providing
for interim relief, are not subject to preemption concerns. As a result,
states are given the opportunity to include procedural rules in their
arbitration legislation that are particularly receptive to the needs of
parties to international commercial arbitrations.2 ° This not only
allows states the opportunity to include in their arbitration legislation
procedural rules that help in maintaining the efficiency of the arbitral
process, but in doing so, states are also given the opportunity to com-
pete for arbitration business by providing procedural rules that are
increasingly receptive to the needs of parties.2' If North Carolina truly
seeks to "promote and facilitate international trade and commerce"22
within the state, then it should take advantage of this opportunity to
improve the arbitral process. Doing so will not only benefit those who
presently conduct international commercial arbitrations within the
state, but may also bring increased arbitration business and interna-
tional commerce to North Carolina.
This Comment argues that North Carolina should reexamine the
interim relief provisions under the ICACA in order to reduce reliance
on court assistance during the arbitral process, thereby identifying
itself as a forum for international commercial arbitration that is
increasingly receptive to the needs of the parties involved. Part I will
generally describe when the ICACA applies in light of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA). Part II will further discuss why, in light of this rela-
tionship between federal and state arbitration law, North Carolina
should reexamine the interim relief provisions under the ICACA. Part
III will highlight four issues concerning interim relief provisions that
should be examined and offer suggestions for legislators and practi-
tioners to consider in confronting these issues.
20. See Hayford, supra note 1, at 203.
21. Id.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.30 (2007).
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I. NORTH CAROLINA'S INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT AND ITS APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The ICACA applies to "international commercial arbitration ...
subject to any applicable international agreement in force between the
United States of America and any other nation or nations, or any fed-
eral statute. 23 The Act further provides that an arbitration is "interna-
tional" if: (1) the parties to the arbitration have their places of business
in different nations when the agreement is concluded; (2) the place of
arbitration is in a different nation; (3) any place where a substantial
part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be per-
formed is in a different nation; (4) the place with which the subject
matter of the dispute is most closely connected is in a different nation;
or (5) the parties expressly agree that the subject matter of the arbitra-
tion agreement relates to more than one nation.24 The Act states that
arbitration is "commercial" if it "arises out of a relationship of a com-
mercial nature. 25
The FAA contains three chapters, each with far-reaching applica-
tions.26 Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31(a) (2007). The North Carolina Act is the only state
international commercial arbitration legislation that expressly recognizes preemption
by federal statute. Zeft, supra note 32, at 720.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31(b) (2007).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31(e) (2007). The Act further provides examples of a
"relationship of a commercial nature":
(1) A transaction for the exchange of goods and services;
(2) A distribution agreement;
(3) A commercial representation or agency;
(4) An exploitation agreement or concession;
(5) A joint venture or other related form of industrial business cooperation;
(6) The carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, land, or road;
(7) A contract or agreement relating to construction, insurance, licensing,
factoring, leasing, consulting, engineering, financing, or banking;
(8) The transfer of data or technology;
(9) The use or transfer of intellectual or industrial property, including trade
secrets, trademarks, trade names, patents, copyrights, and software
programs;
(10) A contract for the provision of any type of professional service, whether
provided by an employee or an independent contractor.
Id.
26. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
[Vol. 30:389392
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the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal.27
Chapter 1 defines "commerce" as "commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations .... ",28 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this to include the full extent of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. 29 Thus, Chapter 1 would apply to an arbitration agree-
ment included in a contract between a U.S. party and a foreign party,
or two foreign parties, if such contract implicated interstate com-
merce. 30  Commerce "with foreign nations" has been interpreted
broadly to include, for example, contracts between a U.S. corporation
or U.S. national and a foreign corporation, negotiated in a foreign
country, and performed in that country.31
Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the United States' obligations
under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).32 Similarly,
Chapter 3 implements such obligations under the Inter-American Con-
vention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Conven-
tion).33 Chapter 3 plays a secondary role to Chapter 2, applying only
when the majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citi-
zens of states that have ratified the Panama Convention.34 Otherwise,
the New York Convention applies. 35
The New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards; arbitral agreements that may result in awards
"made in the territory of a [Nation] other than the [Nation] where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought;" and "arbitral
awards not considered as domestic awards in the [Nation] where their
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
29. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995). See also
William W. Park, Text and Context In International Dispute Resolution, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ.
191, 203-05 (1997); Hayford, supra note 1, at 182-93 (tracing the development of the
FAA from its early application in federal courts only to its current interpretation).
30. Zeft, supra note 4, at 726.
31. Zeft, supra note 4, at 724. However, commerce "with foreign nations" requires a
U.S. nexus. Id. at 725.
32. See 9 U.S.C. § 201-208 (2000). See also Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the
Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 17, 29-42 (2002); Zeft, supra note 4, at 707.
33. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2000). See also Karamanian, supra note 32, at 42-43;
Zeft, supra note 4, at 707.
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). See also Karamanian, supra note 32, at 43.
35. See 9 U.S.C. § 305.
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recognition and enforcement are sought. ' 36 United States courts have
interpreted "nondomestic" awards to include arbitral awards resulting
from arbitration between two foreign parties conducted in the United
States pursuant to United States arbitration law.37 Thus, considering
both Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA, there are few instances in which the
ICACA, despite its own broad application, will apply to an interna-
tional commercial arbitration that is not also within the scope of the
FAA.38
Despite this, state legislation may apply so long as it is not pre-
empted by the FAA.39 The Supreme Court has held that the FAA does
not "reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitra-
tion."40 Thus, state arbitration law may apply unless it "actually con-
flicts with federal law."' 4 ' As one commentator has pointed out, the
state laws that have been struck down as conflicting with the FAA are
those laws that regulated or restricted arbitration and thereby inter-
fered with the FAA's pro-arbitration policy. 42 Thus, in order to avoid
36. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. I, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
37. Zeft, supra note 4, at 729.
38. See Id. at 720-34 (discussing when an international commercial arbitration
agreement would not be within the scope of the FAA).
39. See Hayford, supra note 1; Park, supra note 29; Zeft, supra note 4.
40. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989).
41. Id. For a further discussion of when state arbitration law "actually conflicts"
with the FAA, see Zeft, supra note 4, at 734-783.
42. See Hayford, supra note 1, at 194. See also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 682-83 (1996) (invalidating a Montana statute that required front-page
notice of arbitration clauses contained in a contract); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54, 64 (1995) (striking down a New York
decision that precluded award of punitive damages in arbitration); Allied-Bruce
Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268-69 (1995) (striking down an Alabama statute
that nullified pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer transactions); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484, 493 (1987) (invalidating a California statute that
restricted the collection of wages to state court); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 3-5, 17 (1984) (invalidating a California statute that required that franchise
conflicts be litigated only in court).
The Supreme Court has recognized the FAA's pro-arbitration policy. See Volt, 489
U.S. at 479 (holding that the FAA's primary purpose is to "ensur[e] that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms"); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (holding that the FAA "was motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had
entered"); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) ("[Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration."); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974)
(holding that the FAA was designed to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to
[Vol. 30:389394
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preemption concerns, state arbitration legislation must be no more
restrictive of arbitration than the FAA.43 Furthermore, state provisions
that seek to further the arbitral process and give effect to the parties'
contractual agreement do not raise significant preemption concerns.44
"If state arbitration rules supply terms the parties would likely have
bargained for had they considered the issue . . . arbitration contracts
are put on similar ground as other contracts. '45 State law provisions
that provide procedural rules for the conduct of the arbitration, such
as interim relief provisions, perform such a function and therefore do
not raise significant preemption concerns. So long as state arbitration
law is not preempted, it may apply under the proper circumstances, in
both state and federal court. 46
II. WHY NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD REEXAMINE THE ICACA's INTERIM
RELIEF PROVISIONS
The FAA does not contain any provisions concerning interim
relief.4 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court has not addressed the ability of
arbitration agreements" and "place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as
other contracts"' (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
North Carolina has also expressly recognized and followed this strong public
policy in favor of arbitration. E.g., Johnston County, N.C. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 414
S.E.2d 30, 32 (N.C. 1992) ("North Carolina has a strong public policy favoring the
settlement of disputes by arbitration."); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. Lafave Co.,
321 S.E.2d 872, 876 (N.C. 1984) ("Because of the strong public policy in North
Carolina favoring arbitration courts must closely scrutinize any allegation of waiver of
such a favored right." (citation omitted) (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25)).
43. Park, supra note 29, at 204. See also, Hayford, supra note 1, at 201 ("The
guiding preemption principle would seem to be whether the state arbitration rule is
consistent with the twin purposes of the FAA: namely, to overcome hostility to
arbitration and to effectuate the parties' arbitration agreement.").
44. Hayford, supra note 1, at 193.
45. Id. at 201.
46. As to instances where state international commercial arbitration may apply in
state court, see Zeft, supra note 4, at 720-734. As to instances where such legislation
may apply in federal court, see Walker, supra note 7, at 457. Note also that state
international commercial arbitration legislation may apply if a particular arbitration
agreement is outside of the scope of the FAA. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, it appears that the Supreme Court has recognized, in light of the
FAA's primary purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms,
that parties may agree to apply state arbitration law to an arbitration even if such
application would frustrate an arbitration that the FAA would otherwise allow, so long
as the parties have expressly selected state law over federal law. See Zeft, supra note 4,
at 783-93 (discussing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
47. Walker, supra note 7, at 433.
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courts to order interim relief in aid of arbitration. 4' The absence of
such procedural guidance in federal arbitration law has had two signif-
icant effects. First, it has created a split among the federal circuit
courts concerning the ability of courts to order interim relief in aid of
arbitration.49 Second, it has created a niche for state arbitration law,
in which state statutes "apply as procedural supplements to the [FAA]
in an interstate or international transaction. '5 0 Both of these circum-
stances reveal a need for North Carolina to (1) reexamine its interim
relief provisions under the ICACA in order to reduce party reliance on
court-ordered interim relief in aid of arbitration, and (2) identify itself
as a forum for international commercial arbitration that is particularly
receptive to the needs of the parties involved.
A. The Need To Reduce Party Reliance on Court Assistance in Aid of
Arbitration
Preemption and court precedent aside, North Carolina should
attempt to reduce the amount of court involvement in arbitral proceed-
ings due to the fact that such assistance from the judiciary is disrup-
tive to the arbitral process, and it diminishes the advantages and
attractiveness of arbitration.5' Court involvement threatens the confi-
dentiality associated with the arbitral process, reduces the informality
and neutrality of the proceedings, and increases the costs and com-
plexity of arbitration.52 Furthermore, the need for court assistance
results in lengthy delays, jurisdictional problems, and the possibility
that courts will not order interim measures of protection for fear of
interfering with the arbitral process. 53
It is this reluctance on the part of the courts to order interim relief
in aid of arbitration that furthers the need for North Carolina to reduce
party reliance on court assistance in the arbitral process. Due to the
absence of any federal law addressing the ability of courts to order
interim measures of relief in aid of arbitration, there is a split among
the circuit courts concerning whether courts may order pre-award
48. Hayford, supra note 1, at 200.
49. See generally, Charles H. Brower, II, Note, What I Tell You Three Times Is True:
U.S. Courts and Pre-Award Interim Measures Under the New York Convention, 35 VA. J.
INT'L L. 971 (1995).
50. William P. Mills, III, Note, State International Arbitration Statutes and the U.S.
Arbitration Act: Unifying the Availability of Interim Relief, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 604,
609 (1990).
51. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 57.
52. Noah Rubins, In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash: Security for Costs in
International Commercial Arbitration, 11 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 307, 319 (2000).
53. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 57.
[Vol. 30:389396
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attachment in aid of arbitration.54 The Fourth Circuit is in the minor-
ity, holding that such court-ordered pre-award attachment is not avail-
able." In I.T.A.D. Associates v. Podar Bros., the Fourth Circuit held
that pre-award attachment granted by the district court was "contrary
to the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the [New York] Conven-
tion."'5 6 While the holding in Podar could certainly be questioned, 57 it
has been viewed as binding precedent.5 8 In Alamria v. Telcor Interna-
tional, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held:
The Fourth Circuit has held that an attachment.., is contrary to
a party's arbitration agreement as well as the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards .... This court is
aware that other courts have taken different approaches ... however
Podar is controlling in this Circuit.
5 9
Other than the obvious fact that the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Podar may be relied upon by North Carolina courts to deny pre-award
attachment in aid of arbitration, this holding has further implications
pertaining to provisions in the ICACA that authorize courts to order
54. See, e.g., I.T.A.D. Assocs. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981); and
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974). C.f.,
Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prod. Co. Ltd., 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1990); and E.A.S.T.
Inc. v. M/V Alaia, 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989). There is also a divergence among
federal courts concerning whether courts may issue preliminary injunctions in aid of
arbitration. Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d
1286 (8th Cir. 1984) (preliminary injunction denied), with In re Y & A Group Sec.
Litig., 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994). However, the Fourth Circuit has held that this form
of interim relief is allowed under the FAA, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe language of § 3 [of the FAA] does
not preclude a district court from granting one party a preliminary injunction to
preserve the status quo pending arbitration."), dist'g Pisgah Labs, Inc. v. Pharmaforce,
Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30523 (W.D.N.C. 2005) (denying preliminary injunction
because granting it would essentially moot the arbitration because the plaintiff would
obtain the very relief sought), and therefore this inconsistency among federal courts
does not present as much of a threat to international commercial arbitration in North
Carolina as compared to the Fourth Circuit's refusal to order pre-award attachment in
aid of arbitration.
55. See, e.g. I.T.A.D., 636 F.2d at 77; Alamria v. Telcor Int'l Inc., 920 F.Supp. 658,
675 (D. Md. 1996).
56. I.T.A.D., 636 F.2d at 77 (citing to McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038 (holding that
Article 11(3) of the New York Convention prohibits courts from ordering pre-award
attachment in aid of arbitration)).
57. The attachment was not actually in aid of arbitration. Id.
58. See Alamria, 920 F.Supp. at 675.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
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such interim measures.6 ° Under this precedent, one might argue that a
provision authorizing court-ordered pre-award attachment conflicts
with the New York Convention, and therefore should be preempted.6'
The possibility that pre-award attachment could be denied under
Podar complicates the arbitral process in North Carolina by creating
uncertainty as to a party's ability to actually obtain interim relief. This
uncertainty, combined with the other negative impacts of court
involvement in the arbitral process, suggests that North Carolina
should reexamine the ICACA with an eye toward reducing party reli-
ance on the courts when seeking interim relief in aid of arbitration.
B. The Need to Improve the Arbitral Process in General
While creating confusion in the courts, the silence of both the
FAA and the United States Supreme Court regarding matters of proce-
dure in arbitration has also created an opportunity for states to fill
such gaps with their own procedural rules. 62 This opportunity allows
states to craft procedural rules that are increasingly receptive to the
needs of parties. In doing so, states are also given the opportunity to
compete with other states and arbitral institutions for arbitration
business.63
Under the federal arbitration system, in which any state law that
conflicts with the FAA's pro-arbitration policy is preempted, there are
no significant preemption concerns for state procedural rules so long
as they aid the arbitral process.64 In comparison, state legislative abil-
ity is limited on matters covered by the FAA and matters that have
been addressed by the United States Supreme Court; namely, issues of
enforcement or the validity of an arbitration agreement or arbitral
60. See Zeft, supra note 4, at 765-66 ("If the applicable court precedent in a
particular case holds that Article 11(3) of the New York Convention prohibits a court
from ordering pre-award attachment prior to a pending arbitration, then one could
argue that the New York Convention would preempt a state law provision permitting
such court-ordered attachment.").
61. See Zeft, supra note 4, at 770-72, for a discussion of how cases like Podar
resulted from a misreading of Article 11(3) of the New York Convention, and why such
an argument would fail. This comment highlights a possible problem that parties
seeking interim relief in aid of arbitration may face in North Carolina.
62. See generally Hayford, supra note 1.
63. Id. at 203.
64. Id. at 195. In the Hayford & Palmiter article, they describe a "blueprint of
'arbitration federalism"' in which the FAA is at the core, and those issues not
addressed by federal law are in a "large penumbra" where federal law is silent, and
"state law in the form of default procedural rules holds out great promise, limited only
by the gravitational pull of the FAA's pro-arbitration imperative." Id. at 177-78.
398 [Vol. 30:389
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award.65 Because states may only mimic the provisions contained in
the FAA on such substantive matters, states must attempt to differenti-
ate their arbitration legislation from other state arbitration laws or
institutional rules by providing procedural rules that are comparatively
more receptive to the needs of parties.
One commentator has compared this system to that of a corporate
charter "whose validity arises as a matter of federal constitutional law,
but whose terms and enforcement are a matter for the state in which
the parties choose to incorporate. '66 In other words, the need for state
procedural rules to act as gap-fillers in the federal arbitration system
presents an opportunity for states to compete for arbitration busi-
ness.67 North Carolina, however, is not only competing with other
states that have international commercial arbitration legislation, 68 but
also with arbitral institutions that provide procedural rules and other
services to aid parties with the arbitral process. Such institutional
rules include those of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) 69 and the American Arbitration Association (AAA).7°
North Carolina should take advantage of the opportunity to
improve arbitral procedures simply because it will benefit those who
currently participate in international commercial arbitration within
the state. It is also possible that by crafting arbitral procedures that are
increasingly receptive to the needs of parties, North Carolina may
draw increased arbitration business into the state. Such increased effi-
ciency in international commercial arbitration may encourage those
65. Id. at 195. While the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress, in
enacting the FAA, did not intend to occupy the entire field of arbitration, Hayford and
Palmiter argue that as it relates to "questions of validity and arbitrability, the Court has
left state law no room to maneuver. In effect, the Court has occupied the field." Id.
66. Id. at 203.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11 to 1297.432 (West 2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-100 to 50a-136 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01 -
684.35 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to 9-9-43 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 658D-1 to 658D-9 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-
01 to 3-2B-09 (LexisNexis 2006); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2712.01 to 2712.91
(LexisNexis 2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450 to 36.558 (2005); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 172.001 to 172.310 (Vernon 2005).
69. See ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rulesarb-english.pdf; see also ICC, Rules for
a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure (1999), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules-pre-arbitral-english.pdf.
70. See AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures (2007), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28144.
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that participate in international commerce to conduct more of their
business from within North Carolina.
Thus, the absence of federal arbitration law addressing procedural
matters has created both the opportunity and the need for North Caro-
lina to reexamine the ICACA in order to provide parties with interim
measures of relief that will reduce the amount of court involvement in
the arbitral process, and improve the arbitral process as a whole.
III. AREAS OF INTERIM RELIEF THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED
In reexamining the interim relief provisions under the ICACA,
North Carolina should focus on four issues that have been the subject
of debate among commentators in the area of international commer-
cial arbitration.7 These include: (1) the availability of interim relief
prior to creation of the arbitral tribunal; (2) the availability of ex parte
interim measures of protection; (3) guidelines for arbitrators to follow
in determining whether to order interim relief; and (4) enforcement of
interim measures of protection.72 Only the issues concerning the avail-
ability of interim relief prior to the creation of the arbitral tribunal and
enforcement of interim measures of protection implicate the need to
reduce court assistance in the arbitral process in North Carolina.73
However, each of these issues reflects an opportunity for the state to
provide procedural rules for the conduct of international commercial
arbitrations that are increasingly receptive to the needs of the parties
involved. In considering these issues, North Carolina should take note
of the recent amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 4 as well as the recently revised rules of
the ICC 75 and AAA.7
6
71. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 2.
72. Id.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39(b) (2005) ("In all other cases [other than where
the arbitrator or arbitrators have not been appointed, or where the arbitrator or
arbitrators are unavailable], a party shall seek interim measures . . . from the arbitral
tribunal and shall have no right to seek interim relief from the superior court, except
that a party to an arbitration governed by this Article may request from the superior
court enforcement of an order of an arbitral tribunal granting interim measures...").
74. See generally, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-
86998_Ebook.pdf.
75. See, supra note 69.
76. See, supra note 70.
400 [Vol. 30:389
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A. Availability of Interim Relief Prior to Constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal
It can take months for an arbitral tribunal to be established. 7
During this time, it is necessary for there to be procedures in place so
that the parties may request interim measures in order to protect assets
and evidence.78 The ICACA provides that "where the arbitrator or arbi-
trators have not been appointed, or where the arbitrator or arbitrators
are unavailable, a party may seek interim relief directly from the supe-
rior court . . . .by the law applicable to the type of interim relief
sought."79 While this is a step above the rules of arbitration that do
not address the availability of interim relief prior to the formation of
the arbitral tribunal,8 ° parties are still forced to turn to the courts in
order to receive interim relief.
While the revised Model Law does not offer any new guidance on
this issue, both the ICC and the AAA have interim relief provisions
that provide procedures for parties to follow in order to obtain interim
relief prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal.8 ' Article 37 of the
AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures provides for "Emer-
gency Measures of Protection."82 These are mandatory rules that will
apply unless the parties agree otherwise.83 Under the rules, a party in
need of "emergency" relief prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal
must notify an "administrator" who will then appoint an "emergency
arbitrator" from a particular panel of arbitrators designated for such a
purpose.8 4 This special arbitrator is limited to providing "any interim
or conservancy measure the emergency arbitrator deems necessary,
including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or conserva-
tion of property. "85
The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure operate in
much the same way, with the appointment of a "Pre-Arbitral Referee"
rather than an "emergency arbitrator," who is limited to awarding
77. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 58.
78. Id. at 55.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39(a) (2007).
80. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 58 (stepping above such rules because it expressly
addresses the issue, and because it confronts many jurisdictional issues). See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-567.36 (2007) (discussing the venue and jurisdiction of courts).
81. See AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 70, art. 37;
ICC, Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, supra note 69.
82. AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 70, art. 37.
83. Id. art. 37(1).
84. Id. art. 37(2), (3).
85. Id. art. 37(4).
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interim relief provisions under certain circumstances.86 The ICC rules
have been criticized as being ineffective because, as compared to the
AAA rules, they are optional rather than mandatory.87 Regardless of
the effectiveness of either of these rules, they are both steps in the right
direction as they offer a procedure for parties to international commer-
cial arbitration to follow in obtaining interim relief prior to the consti-
tution of the tribunal without the need to seek assistance from the
courts.
B. Availability of Ex Parte Interim Relief
"Ex parte interim measures of protection are orders made against
a party who has not been given notice or a chance to be heard, prior to
the declaration of the order.""8 Commentators have argued that "ex
parte interim measures of protection are necessary in certain circum-
stances when there is a sense of urgency and surprise is necessary to
avoid the possibility of harm to a party. '"89 There is, however, an ongo-
ing debate concerning whether the arbitral tribunal should have the
power to order such relief.90
Some commentators argue that arbitral tribunals should have the
discretion to order such measures; that parties seeking ex parte mea-
sures are often required to post security as protection of the other
party's rights; and that arbitral orders that are wrongfully made may
be amended during subsequent hearings. 91 However, others argue that
parties to an arbitral tribunal have a right to be heard, especially in
light of the fact that arbitral decisions are binding, often with no right
to appeal;92 that the amount of security paid is often not sufficient to
return the injured party to the position it was in prior to the award of
ex parte interim relief; and that there is too great a danger that such
power will be abused by the arbitral tribunal. 93
In light of this controversy, it is important for parties, arbitrators,
and courts to have clearly defined procedural rules informing them of
the availability of ex parte interim measures. The ICACA does not
address this issue at all.94 In fact, under the ICACA, the only instances
86. See ICC, Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, supra note 69.
87. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 58-59.
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.67 (2007) (discussing the right to appeal under the
ICACA).
93. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 59.
94. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-.67 (2007).
[Vol. 30:389
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in which a party may seek interim relief from a court is prior to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal or to enforce an award of the tribu-
nal ordering interim measures of relief.95 Thus, if the arbitral tribunal
is unwilling to award ex parte interim relief, then a party seeking such
relief would be left with no recourse.
In addressing this issue, the revised Model Law, which includes
significant revisions concerning this matter, offers guidance.96 Section
two of the revised Model Law is devoted to what UNCITRAL termed
"Preliminary Orders. 97 Article 17(B)(1) provides: "Unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, a party may, without notice to any other party,
make a request for an interim measure together with an application for
a preliminary order directing a party not to frustrate the purpose of the
interim measure requested."9' The Secretariat commentary to the
revised Model Law explains that preliminary orders "provide a means
for preserving the status quo until the arbitral tribunal issues an
interim measure adopting or modifying the preliminary order."99
Article 17 addresses many of the concerns expressed by those
commentators that do not believe that an arbitral tribunal should have
the power to award ex parte interim measures of relief. For example,
Article 17 attempts to prevent the tribunal's abuse of such power by
offering guidance on when preliminary orders may be granted.100 Fur-
thermore, Article 17 addresses the issue of a party's right to be heard,
and the absence of appeals in arbitration, by providing that the party
against whom the preliminary order is directed shall have an opportu-
nity to present its case "at the earliest practicable time." '' In addition,
the preliminary order is limited in duration to a maximum of twenty
days after which time the tribunal must issue an interim measure
"adopting or modifying the preliminary order" or simply allowing the
order to expire.'0 2
Lastly, UNCITRAL attempted to address the issue of insufficient
security provided by a party seeking ex parte interim relief. According
95. Id.
96. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 74, art. 17(B)-17(C).
97. See id.
98. Id. art. 17(B)(1).
99. UNCITRAL Explanatory Note, supra note 8.
100. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note
74, art. 17(B)(2) ("The arbitral tribunal may grant a preliminary order provided it
considers that prior disclosure of the request for the interim measure to the party
against whom it is directed risks frustrating the purpose of the measure.").
101. Id. art. 17(C)(2).
102. Id. art. 17(C)(3).
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to UNCITRAL, a party requesting interim measures or preliminary
orders "shall be liable for any costs and damages caused by the mea-
sure or the order to any party if the arbitral tribunal later determines
that, in the circumstances, the measure or the order should not have
been granted." °3 Thus, the revised Model Law offers significant gui-
dance for the adoption of provisions addressing the ability of the arbi-
tral tribunal to award ex parte interim relief. These revisions are
especially helpful in that they address many of the concerns expressed
by those who feel that arbitrators should not be allowed to order this
form of interim relief.
C. Guidelines for Arbitrators
The ICACA provides that "the arbitral tribunal may, at the request
of a party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection
as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the sub-
ject matter of the dispute. ' 10 4 Thus, as is the case under most arbitral
rules, arbitrators are given a great deal of discretion in ordering interim
relief. 10 5 Despite this discretion, arbitrators are often reluctant to order
such protective measures. 106 This is possibly due to fears on the part
of arbitrators that such an order will make it appear as though they
favor one party over another, or that they are making a premature deci-
sion on the merits, which would affect the potential for voluntary com-
pliance by the affected party. 10 7 Similarly, there may be some fear on
the part of arbitrators that valid claims will be effectively prohibited
because parties will not be able to meet the financial security require-
ments imposed by interim measures. l 08
Commentators have suggested, however, that if there were more
guidelines for arbitrators to follow in ordering interim relief, they
would not be so reluctant.10 9 Such guidelines would allow the parties,
courts, and arbitrators to know the rights and responsibilities of the
arbitrators and, therefore, alleviate any doubt and reluctance on their
part.110
103. Id. art. 17(G).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.47 (2007).
105. See Ferguson, supra note 2, at 60.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Rubins, supra note 52, at 320.
109. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 60.
110. Id.
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Again, the revised Model Law offers significant guidance in this
area."' 1 Article 17(A), entitled "Conditions for granting interim mea-
sures," provides two requirements that a party seeking interim relief
has the burden of proving to the tribunal. 1 2 First, the party must sat-
isfy the tribunal that "[h]arm not adequately reparable by an award of
damages is likely to result if the measure is not ordered, and such
harm substantially outweighs the harm that is likely to result to the
party against whom the measure is directed if the measure is
granted."'1 13 Second, the party must show that "[tlhere is a reasonable
possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the
claim."' 14 While these guidelines continue to allow the arbitral tribu-
nal a great deal of discretion in ordering interim measures of relief, it is
certainly an improvement over the limited guidance currently offered
in the ICACA.
D. Enforcement of Interim Relief
One of the most significant issues concerning interim relief in
international commercial arbitration is that of enforcement. If interim
relief is not enforceable, it is meaningless. 1 15 Most rules of arbitration
provide that the arbitral tribunal may order interim relief; however,
they do not provide any method for the enforcement of such provi-
sions. 1 1 6 Thus, parties are forced to turn to the courts seeking enforce-
ment of the tribunal's order." 7 The ICACA expressly provides that a
party "may request from the superior court enforcement of an order of
an arbitral tribunal granting interim measures.""" Again, this is an
improvement over many arbitral rules, as it expressly grants the courts
power to respond to non-compliance with arbitral orders and, in con-
junction with other provisions, solves any jurisdictional issues. 1 9
However, parties remain dependent on the courts for enforcement,
thereby diminishing the advantages and attractiveness of international
commercial arbitration. If the arbitral tribunal were given more power
to enforce its own orders for interim relief, the need for parties to seek
court assistance would be significantly reduced.
111. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 74, art. 17(A).
112. Id.
113. Id. art. 17(A)(1)(a).
114. Id. art. 17(A)(1)(b).
115. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 57.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39(b) (2007).
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.36 (2007).
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Neither the revised Model Law, the recently revised ICC, nor the
AAA rules provide guidance on these issues. 120 As one commentator
has pointed out, however, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 does
provide an example in which the arbitral tribunal has increased power
to coerce parties to comply with orders for interim relief. 12 Under
Article 41, entitled "Powers of tribunal in case of party's default," the
English Arbitration Act provides that if a party "fails to comply with
any other kind of peremptory order, then . . .the tribunal" may: (1)
"direct that the party in default shall not be entitled to rely upon any
allegation or material which was the subject matter of the order;" (2)
"draw such adverse inferences from the act of non-compliance as the
circumstances justify;" (3) "proceed to an award on the basis of such
materials as have been properly provided to it;" or (4) "make such
order as it thinks fit as to the payment of costs of the arbitration
incurred in consequence of the non-compliance."1 22 Thus, the English
Arbitration Act provides at least one example of arbitral rules that have
given arbitrator's increased power to enforce their own orders for
interim relief.
CONCLUSION
Legislators and practitioners should take note of these attempts to
address such issues confronting interim relief in international com-
mercial arbitration. As to each of these issues, legislators may consider
these rules when reexamining the ICACA in order to create a proce-
dure for international commercial arbitration that reduces party reli-
ance on the courts and is more receptive to the needs of parties
generally. The legislature should do so in order to better the arbitral
process for those who currently participate in international commer-
cial arbitration in North Carolina, while also increasing the likelihood
that more businesses will find the state an attractive forum for con-
ducting arbitration business and international commerce. In the mean
time, practitioners may take note of the issues that they may confront
while participating in an international commercial arbitration in
120. See generally UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
supra note 74, art. 17; ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 69, art. 23; AAA
International Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 70, art. 37.
121. See Ferguson, supra note 2, at 58.
122. English Arbitration Act of 1996, Art. 41(7), available at http://www.opsi.gov.
uk/ACTS/actsl 996/ukpga-19960023_en 3#ptl-pb7-1lg39.
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North Carolina and attempt to address these issues in their client's
arbitration agreements.
R. Jeremy Sugg
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